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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
DAVID K. PETIT, : Case No. 960032-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following are set forth in full in Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-502 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(2) (1995) (repealed effective May 1, 
1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(Responding to State's brief at p.2) 
The State misquotes State v. Anderson, 910 P. 2d 1229 
(Utah 1996) for an improper standard of review. At 910 P. 2d at 
1234, Anderson cites for a different proposition State v. Rocha, 
600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979), which in turn quotes State v. 
Eastmond, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (Utah 1972), for a now incorrect 
clearly erroneous standard of review for probable cause 
determinations. The language the State attributes to Anderson 
arises from Eastmond, is quoted in Rocha, but appears nowhere in 
Anderson. 
Anderson itself states the standard of review as follows: 
We review the factual findings underlying the 
trial court's decision under the clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992) . 
This court will find that clear error exists only if the 
factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record. State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). However, this court 
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based on 
such facts under a correctness standard, according no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Pena, 
869 P.2d at 936; accord State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 
(Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 
1991) . 
Anderson, 910 P. 2d at 1232. Contrary to the State's incorrect 
assertion, the issue in this appeal is not subject to a clearly 
erroneous standard of review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. A PROTECTIVE SEIZURE IS DISTINGUISHABLE 
FROM AN INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point I, pp. 8-19) 
The State presents its argument as though the police were 
engaged in a valid Terry stop prior to the sudden movement that 
gave rise to Officer Tuttle's safety concern. This is not so; 
prior to the sudden movement, police had no reason to suspect Mr. 
Petit of any crime. R. 33, 35, 36, 47, 48-9. Unlike the typical 
protective seizure case, where a valid Terry stop or other police 
action is already under way, this case began as a protective 
seizure. 
This case likewise must be distinguished from routine 
traffic stops. Here, Mr. Petit was not stopped by the police prior 
to them drawing their weapons upon him. The State cites Michigan 
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v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1048 n.13, 103 S.Ct 3469, 3480 n.13, 77 
L.Ed.2d 1201, 1219 n.13 (1983), for statistics concerning police 
shootings when an officer approaches a stopped vehicle, State's 
brief at 12, but those situations generally arise during traffic 
stops. Here, Mr. Petit had not been stopped, and no encounter with 
the police had been initiated. The police had less to fear than in 
a traffic stop, where the encounter has already been initiated and 
the suspect is cognizant of an imminent request for identification 
and a warrants check. Simply stated, citizens do not on a regular 
basis go "hunting" for police officers to assault or kill, and 
certainly not officers in groups of three. 
POINT II. THE STATE'S FACILE ATTEMPT TO 
DISTINGUISH CASES RELIED UPON BY MR. PETIT IS 
NOT WELL TAKEN. 
(Responding to State's brief at p. 14) 
The State attempts to distinguish all of the authority 
relied on by appellant "since none of the suspects involved made a 
sudden movement posing an immediate potential threat to the 
officers." State's brief at 14. This distinction is wholly 
without merit. The State fails to cite any case for the 
proposition that, under the fourth amendment, a sudden movement 
justifies any response regardless of the force involved. Appellant 
is aware of none. 
Fourth amendment issues are fact intensive, and 
reasonableness is reviewed under the totality of the circumstances. 
E.g. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1202 (Utah 1995). The State 
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recognizes this proposition in its brief. State's Br. at 6 ("Under 
the totality of the circumstances . . . " ) ; 12 ("In reviewing the 
totality of facts and circumstances here . . . " ) ; 14 ("Under the 
totality of circumstances . . . " ) ; and 15 ("And it must make the 
determination after evaluating [t]he 'totality of the 
circumstances.' United States v. Fernandez. 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th 
Cir. 1994) . ") . 
The sudden movement at issue here must be considered 
under the totality of the circumstances, and does not distinguish 
case law cited by Mr. Petit. Here, the sudden movement gave rise 
to Officer Tuttle's safety concern. In United States v. King, 990 
F.2d 1552 (10th Cir. 1993), it was the officer's observation of a 
loaded handgun on the front seat of the vehicle that gave rise to 
safety concerns. If anything, the safety concern in King was more 
palpable than that here. Mr. Petit's sudden movement was equally 
consistent with spilling a cup of coffee. The loaded handgun in 
King was not as potentially innocuous as a spilled cup of coffee. 
A loaded handgun is always dangerous. Here, in fact, there was no 
weapon at all. 
POINT III. THE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED THE 
ENCOUNTER ONCE MR. PETIT'S HANDS WERE IN VIEW 
AND HE NO LONGER POSED ANY SAFETY HAZARD. 
(Responding to State's brief at p. 19.) 
The State asserts that holding Mr. Petit at gunpoint, 
approaching his vehicle, and looking to see what he may have 
spilled or been reaching for, was reasonable, necessary, and "the 
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least intrusive means available to see what defendant was reaching 
for." State's brief at 19. The State seems to be suggesting that 
the officers had a sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion of 
contraband to permit them to search Mr. Petit1s vehicle. This is 
not so. 
This encounter was initiated as a result of Mr. Petit 's 
sudden movement. Officer Tuttle had no idea what Mr. Petit may 
have been reaching for, may have spilled, or any other reason why 
the sudden movement was made. The movement, coupled with the 
officers's experience and the location in the high crime area 
around Pioneer Park, led to a reasonable concern that Mr. Petit may 
have been about to assault the officers. Under Terry, the scope of 
the encounter must be Ml strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) 
(quoting Warden v. Havden, 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1652, 
18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). 
Officer Tuttle was investigating a possible assault upon 
himself. Once he unholstered his weapon and drew down on Mr. 
Petit, and Mr. Petit complied with orders to freeze and place his 
hands in plain view, Officer Tuttle's reasonable suspicions should 
have been dispelled. At that point in time Mr. Petit was 
compliant, and Office Tuttle was not being assaulted with a weapon 
or in any fashion. There was no longer any need for Office Tuttle 
to have his sidearm aimed at Mr. Petit's head. 
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Significantly, as in King, it was not illegal to carry a 
handgun in a vehicle on October 13, 1994, the date of this offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(2) (1995) (repealed effective May 1, 
1995) . All that was required is that the weapon not be "loaded," 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-502 (1995), meaning that no round can be in 
the firing position and no round can be fired with a single 
mechanical operation. State v. Chapman, 295 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 23 
n.10 (Utah 1996). Utah also issues concealed weapon permits, Utah 
Code Ann. §53-5-704 (Supp. 1996), allowing holders to carry loaded 
weapons in vehicles. Whether Mr. Petit had a firearm is thus 
irrelevant, as it was legal to carry a firearm in a vehicle. 
Despite the complete lack of any present danger to the 
officers, Officer Tuttle continued to hold Mr. Petit at gunpoint. 
Under the fourth amendment, he was arrested as of that moment. The 
police had no reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime had 
been committed, or that one would be committed. Despite his 
curiosity as to what Mr. Petit may have been reaching for, Officer 
Tuttle should have holstered his weapon and proceeded on his way. 
Absent an articulable suspicion, the fourth amendment does not 
allow the police to hold citizens at gunpoint for the sole purpose 
of allowing the police to satisfy their curiosity. Once Mr. Petit 
was compliant, and the perceived danger had thus vanished, it was 
incumbent on Officer Tuttle to holster his weapon and allow Mr. 
Petit to go about his business. 
"The narrow intrusions involved in [Terry and its 
progeny] were judged by a balancing test rather than by the general 
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principle that Fourth Amendment seizures must be supported by the 
'long-prevailing standards' of probable cause, Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. [160,] 176, 69 S.Ct. [1302,] 1311, [93 L.Ed. 1879 
(1949)], only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind 
of intrusion associated with an arrest." Dunawav v. New York, 442 
U.S. 200, 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2256, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). In no 
sense can the intrusion here be characterized as falling "far short 
of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest." Mr. Petit was 
arrested, prior to police discovery of any plain view drug 
paraphernalia. The evidence should have been suppressed. 
Mr. Petit relies on his opening brief in response to 
those portions of the State's brief not specifically addressed 
here. 
CONCLUSION 
The officers' actions here are indistinguishable from an 
arrest. Because the officers' conduct was unreasonably forceful 
and less intrusive actions would have been adequate to protect 
their safety, their actions constitute an arrest without probable 
cause. Mr. Petit's motion to suppress should have been granted. 
This Court should reverse and remand with directions that the 
motion to suppress be granted and Mr. Petit be allowed to withdraw 
his conditional plea. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(2) (1995) (repealed effective 
May 1, 1995) provided: 
Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any 
person, except persons described in Section 76-10-503, 
from keeping within his place of residence, place of 
business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm, 
except that it shall be a class B misdemeanor to carry a 
loaded firearm in a vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) provides: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect -- Grounds. 
A peace office may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
The fourth amendment to the federal constitution 
provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-502 (1995) provides: 
76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded. 
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, any 
pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or other weapon 
described in this part shall be deemed to be loaded when 
there is an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in 
the firing position. 
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed 
to be loaded when an unexpended cartridge, shell, or 
projectile is in a position whereby the manual operation 
of any mechanism once would cause the unexpended 
cartridge, shell, or projectile to be fired. 
(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to 
be loaded when it is capped or primed and has a powder 
charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinders. 
